After recognition of Kosovo’s independence and adoption of the UN Resolution on the Karabakh settlement proposals were made on the possibility of recognizing the Nagorno Karabakh Republic by the Republic of Armenia. Today the Press Center of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Armenia (RA), took an interview on the subject from the Head of the Institute of National Strategic Studies of MoD, RA, Major General, Doctor of Political Sciences Hayk S. Kotanjian.

How does the UN Resolution on the Karabakh problem correlate with the imperatives of the United Nations Charter and the threat of resumption of war? As is known, Russia, the USA and France, as Co-chairs of the Minsk Group, voted against the UN General Assembly’s Resolution on Nagorno Karabakh. The three countries were backed by 4 other UN members and there were 100 abstentions. This fact confirms that, while adopting UN resolutions, the prevailing majority of the UN members do not endorse transgressions against systemic implementation of fundamental principles and norms of International law. Azerbaijan and other 38 states that supported the resolution were taught a lesson on inadmissibility in pushing through documents in the UN contradicting the latter’s fundamental goals and principles which, as a whole, define the international legal-contractual entity of the United Nations. By this voting, the United Nations confirmed that the unilateral approach in the Azerbaijani resolution on the Karabakh conflict, which reflected Azerbaijan’s interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity and thereof ignored the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, was inadmissible. The General Assembly brought forward to the authors of the resolution the fact that Azerbaijan violated her commitments vis-à-vis the UN Charter. Azerbaijan had been virtually pinpointed to her commitments in relation to the definition of “equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination”, which is registered in the UN Charter as one of its fundamental goals. What are the key messages of voting results in the UN? The voting results, in a larger sense, include an important political message about the harmfulness of such resolutions for the UN, which violate the very Charter of the United Nations Organization because they ignore its main goal - to maintain global peace and international security. The voting showed that most UN members recognize the legal shortcomings of Azerbaijan’s stance on the Karabakh settlement. By imposing a counter-productive model of the Karabakh conflict resolution exclusively within the framework of “territorial integrity” - as coined by Azerbaijan - put the UN itself in an awkward situation. Such influential actors in the world community as Russia, the USA, France, and India (the first three are the UN Security Council’s permanent members) which voted against the resolution, as well as those 100 UN member states which abstained, confirmed the major and imperative mission of the UN for all the states: maintenance of international peace. By exceeding ceilings for armaments established by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and by pushing war propaganda, Azerbaijan shows its disregard of the UN Charter’s key principle of promoting peace. This position of official Baku is a real threat to the stability in such a geostrategically important area as the Black Sea Region is. In this respect, by voting against the resolution, Russia, the USA and France, as UN Security Council members, officially declared to the international community their concern about Baku’s preparations for unleashing a new war in the South Caucasus. The denial of the belligerent behavior of Azerbaijan is the other key message of the United Nations. How would you evaluate the chances of reaching a compromise between the Armenian side and Azerbaijan? In defiance of the norms of International law, Baku doesn’t recognize the Nagorno Karabagh Republic (NKR) as subject of International law. At present the Azerbaijani side declares that its compromise is limited merely to its consent of continuing consultations with Armenia on the Karabakh problem. Disturbingly, the Republic of Azerbaijan rejects the possibility of a direct dialogue with the authorities of the NKR. In its public policy not only does Azerbaijan undermine the intermediary mission of the Minsk Group but it also doesn’t respond to the recommendations of the Council of Europe to establish a dialogue with Nagorno Karabakh, in spite of the NKR’s declared preparedness to negotiate with the AzR (see the PACE resolution # 1416, of January 25, 2005). Azerbaijan’s recent activities directed to undermine the status of Russia, the USA and France within the Minsk Group and its attempt to impose on the United Nations a resolution that contradicted the UN Charter, testified about the counter-productivity of the Baku’s position in the Karabakh peace process. Azerbaijan’s “compromise”, as only Baku understands it, is a world away from compromises the Armenian side is prepared to make. In essence, this position is pointless and empty. If Baku doesn’t change its blatantly revanchist position, the chances of reaching a compromise among the parties of the Karabakh conflict are not great. What would you say about the offer to sign an agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the NKR as subjects of International law in response to the UN resolution on Karabakh? The UN member states in their majority couldn’t ignore the fact that in the United Nations’ system peoples struggling for independence are recognized as primary subjects of International law. This viewpoint is based on principles of International law which consider a people struggling for liberation as a legal party. For instance, the People’s League of the Eastern Pakistan, which represented the part of Bengali people residing in Pakistan and unilaterally declared the Republic of Bangladesh, was such a body taken under the protection of International law. The international legal-entity of the part of the Armenian people residing in Karabakh is consolidated by the political and legal fact of uninterrupted and efficient functioning of the legitimate and democratically elected NKR authorities in a period of more than 16 years. These authorities were formed as a result of a referendum held in the period when the Law on the USSR from 1990 to December 21, 1991 was still in force before the proclamation of the Alma-Ata Declaration on the disintegration of the USSR. Thereby, an international-legal basis for concluding international agreements between the RA and the NKR undoubtedly exists. In case Azerbaijan continues rejecting counter-compromises commensurate with the compromises of the Armenian side, the NKR will have the right, taking into consideration the lessons of the history, principles and norms of International law, the OSCE recommendations, to conduct negotiations with the RA on choosing more effective means to maintain regional peace and a model of stable and secure development. To my mind, in this stage, while maintaining the practical interaction in the sphere of defense, it is reasonable not to limit the full-scale cooperation between the NKR and the RA within the frames of any separate sphere. What is your take on a possibility of recognition of the NKR by Armenia? Because of the lack of counter-compromises from Azerbaijan, relatively commensurate with the Armenian proposals, the fact of recognition of the NKR’s independence by the Republic of Armenia seems a logical and a justified component in the process of international recognition of the NKR. In my opinion, at this stage it will be more pragmatic if the process of recognition comes after the development of a cooperation strategy between the NKR and the RA on the questions of maintaining peace, stability and security in the South Caucasus. The main priority of the mentioned Strategy and the policy of its implementation should be a guaranteed exclusion of recurrence of genocide against the Armenians, as well as, secure and democratic development of both sovereign Armenian states in the context of their progressive international integration. If Armenia, Artsakh (Nagorno Karabagh) and the Diaspora in allied cooperation possess an agreed strategy on issues of national priorities, a possibility will arise to develop a mid- and long-term policy, as well as design its effective provision. How do you picture the process of recognition of the NKR? Adhering to the universally-recognized principles and norms of International law the Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia could institutionalize their interstate cooperation. I mean founding a joint Interstate Commission on elaboration and implementation of strategy on cooperation between the NKR and Armenia on questions of maintaining peace and their sustainable and secured development. The Secretariat of the mentioned Interstate Commission on strategic partnership, headed by the presidents of the two countries, could be composed of plenipotentiary representatives of presidents, legislatures, as well as governments of the NKR and the RA. Particular political-legal products of the Interstate Commission’s pursuit, as well as projects of agreements could be presented for reviewing not only to the state institutions of the parties, but also, if necessary, to the respected organizations of the Diaspora and international community. The interests of strengthening and progressive development of the tandem of the Armenian statehood personalized by the RA and the NKR should be placed in the center of the Strategy and systems of planning, accumulation, coordination and targeted implementation of political, economic, defensive and informational resources. I don’t exclude that with time the Interstate Commission will transform the strategic partnership between the RA and the NKR into a loose confederative cooperation between the two fraternal sovereign states. What do you think of the perspectives of the Minsk Group? I think the Minsk Group has accumulated a huge experience in mediating between the parties of the Karabakh conflict and surely has not exhausted its constructive potential.